

Extensive social choice and the problem of paternalism

Kohei Kamaga

Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University,

1-6-1, Nishi-Waseda, Shunjuku-ku, Tokyo, 169-8050, Japan

e-mail: k-kmg@ruri.waseda.jp

August 23, 2006

Abstract. This paper re-examines extensive social choice in which Ooghe and Lauwers (2005) have recently proved non-dictatorial possibilities. We especially focus on conflicting situations involving an individual's paternalistic opinion about some other individual's welfare. Some new axioms are formulated to analyze such conflicting situations in an explicit way. Then, we explore an admissible (class of) aggregation rule for each case where one of those new axioms is imposed in addition to other usual axioms. Some new possibility theorems are established.

Keywords: Extensive Social Choice, Interpersonal Utility Comparisons, Extended Sympathy, Paternalism.

JEL Classification Numbers: D63, D71.