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セッション名 国際貿易 (貿易の自由化と環境問題)

## Trade Liberalization, Lobby Formation, and Environmental Policy

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### 要旨

This paper studies how one country's decision to liberalize trade affects a political economic structure that determines environmental policy in other country. By constructing a political economy model in which formation of lobby groups and environmental policy are endogenously determined, we show that unilateral tariff reductions by a large country importing a dirty good will generate an industry lobby that demands a lax environmental regulation in a small country exporting that good. Then, we show that for a pre-existing lobby, the unilateral tariff reductions cause the formation of its rival lobby and hence move the small country's environmental policy toward the efficient level. Finally, numerical simulations show that the unilateral tariff reductions first cause the formation of industry lobby groups and further reductions of trade barriers will generate an environmental lobby in the small country. These results are consistent with the political forces behind the inverse U-shaped relationship between trade, growth, and the environment.

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