

Multidimensional Cheap-Talk with Sequential Messages *

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Abstract

In this paper, we consider a two-dimensional cheap-talk game where there are two senders and one receiver. The senders possess same information and sequentially send messages about information. In a one-dimensional sequential message cheap-talk model, full information transmission is possible by applying self-serving criterion, which is suggested by Krishna and Morgan (*QJE*, 2001). However, this result crucially depends on the structure of the one-dimensional model. It generally does not hold in the two-dimensional model. We develop a new criterion, extended self-serving criterion, which prevents a deviation that self-serving criterion cannot prevent. Then we show that extended self-serving criterion implies a full revelation equilibrium if and only if senders have opposing biased preferences.

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