

日本経済学会 2007年度春季大会

## 報告要旨

セッション名： ゲーム理論（6月2日 土曜日 14:00-16:00）

会 場： 15号館1階4番教室

報告タイトル： Creation of Social Order in Ethnic Conflict

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要旨： This paper describes a mechanism of ethnic conflict and cooperation, in which the fear of indiscriminate vengeance induces mutual monitoring within the target group of communal violence. In our peer monitoring equilibrium, in-group policing and out-group conflict coexist, and the former is developed by the latter in order to suppress inter-ethnic transgressions. Our theory is in contrast to Fearon and Laitin's (1996) theory of inter-ethnic cooperation which shows no theoretical linkage between the two forms of punishments. Using a social matching game with costly monitoring, we predict that the success of inter-ethnic cooperation hinges heavily on each group's quality of in-group policing and that as a consequence, a group with lower quality of policing tends to have more frequent and longer disputes with other groups. Other comparative-statics analyses will also be discussed.

参考文献： Fearon, J. D. and D. D. Laitin. 1996. "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," *90 American Political Science Review* 715-735.