

Pareto Principles and Positive Responsiveness¹

SUSUMU CATO²

JSPS Fellows/University of Tokyo

Abstract

We investigate the relationship among the weak Pareto condition, the strong Pareto condition, and positive responsibility. First, we show that under a mild domain condition, if a social preference is an ordering, anonymity and neutrality implies that the weak Pareto condition and the strong Pareto condition are equivalent. Next, we show that under another mild domain condition, if a social preference is an ordering, neutrality implies that the strong Pareto condition and positive responsiveness are equivalent. These results implies that we obtain an alternative characterization of the simple majority rule. That is, under an appropriate domain condition, a collective choice rule is the simple majority rule if and only if it satisfies weak Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality. Furthermore, we discuss the well-known three preference assumptions: external restriction, value restriction, and limited agreement. Moreover, we apply our result to impossibility results and a characterization of Pareto rule.

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²Tel: +81-857-29-1383, <mailto:susumu.cato@gmail.com>, Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo, 7-3-1, Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan.