

Strategy-proof mechanisms and uniqueness of matching in marriage markets

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Abstract

We resolve the impossibility introduced by Takagi and Serizawa (2006) and show that in marriage markets, any mechanism that is individually rational and respects pairwise unanimity is strategy-proof on a restricted domain of preferences. The respect for pairwise unanimity, defined by Takagi and Serizawa (2006), is interpreted as the minimally weakened stability property supported by a farsighted viewpoint. Our restriction on the domain of preferences requires agents to prefer themselves the best or second-best. This is supported both theoretically and empirically and is related to the uniqueness of matching that is individually rational and respects pairwise unanimity.

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