Observable Actions*

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Abstract

We consider a game with "meta-players" who observe one another's actions before actual play. The observability exerts an effect resembling repeated games without discounting. The game has Nash equilibria with any individually rational payoff profiles. In addition, the outcomes that satisfy a modified version of evolutionary stability select Pareto efficiency in coordination games.

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