

Best Response Adaptation in Nested Potential Games

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Abstract

This paper proposes the nested indicator potential games. It is shown that, in any nested indicator potential game, for any action profile, there exists a finite best-response improvement path, in which, for each step, one player shifts to a best-response action, that connects to a Nash equilibrium.

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Key words : finite best-response path property, potential games.

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