

Adjacent manipulation

Shin Sato

Faculty of Economics, Fukuoka University

8-19-1 Nanakuma, Jonan-ku, Fukuoka,

JAPAN 814-0180

E-mail: shinsato@adm.fukuoka-u.ac.jp

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Abstract

I propose a new axiom on the incentive to manipulate an outcome of a collective decision making. The axiom, called AM-proofness, says that manipulation cannot occur through the preferences adjacent to the sincere one. Through an example, I give rationales behind AM-proofness. My main result is a simple sufficient condition for the equivalence between AM-proofness and strategy-proofness. I show that the sufficient condition is satisfied by the universal domain and the set of single-peaked preferences. Accordingly, over such domains, the reluctance to make “big lies” is not helpful to construct a social choice function immune from strategic manipulation, and all results about strategy-proofness can be restated with AM-proofness.

Keywords: adjacent manipulation, AM-proofness, single-peaked preferences, social choice function, strategy-proofness.

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