Pay-As-You-Go Pension and the Incentives to Self-educate or

to Educate Children¹

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Abstract

We investigate the relationship between the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension scheme and

the accumulation of human capital. We introduce the incentives of self-education into an

overlapping generations model. The PAYG pension scheme encourages the incentives to

educate children, but it discourages the incentives for their self-education. We show that

the PAYG pension scheme hampers economic growth if self-education and educating

children are complimentary in producing output when the incentives for self-education

are considered. The argument implies that while studying the relationship between the

pension scheme, education, and economic growth, we must focus on determining the

decision maker with regard to education.

Keyword: Pay-As-You-Go, pension, education, economic growth

JEL classification number: D90, H55, I20, O15

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1