

# Social Preference Cycles

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## Abstract

Since Condorcet discovered the voting paradox in the simple majority rule, many scholars have tried to investigate conditions that yield “social-preference cycles.” The paradox can be extended to two main approaches. On the one hand, Kenneth Arrow developed a general framework of social choice theory, on the other, direct generalizations of the paradox were offered. The motivation and surface meaning of the two approaches are different, as are the assumed background conditions. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the two approaches by taking a close look at two works, Ferejohn and Fishburn [Representations of Binary Decision Rules by Generalized Decisiveness Structures, *J. Econ. Theory* 21 (1979), 28–45] and Schwartz [A Procedural Condition Necessary and Sufficient for Cyclic Social Preference, *J. Econ. Theory* 137 (2007), 688–695].

**JEL classification** D71; D72

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