

# Social Choice Theory with Collectively Qualified Agendas

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## Abstract

This paper constructs a model to introduce the process of agenda formation in social choice. We assume that individuals consist of agenda setters and voters. Each agenda setter has opinions over alternatives and they are aggregated by a qualification function to specify which alternatives are eligible for a collective decision making. Each voter has preferences over alternatives and a subset of qualified alternatives is socially chosen by aggregating voters' preferences. We first show that Arrow's impossibility theorem holds in the proposed framework. Further, we apply the model to the literature on the strategic withdrawal of candidates. This paper presents a boundary between the possibility and the impossibility of candidate stability theorems.

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