

Sibling Rivalry and Contest for Family Property Succession

Wataru KUREISHI[†]

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Abstract

We consider a two-stage game where, in stage 1, each sibling decides simultaneously the productive activity to the family property owned by their parents and in stage 2 they compete for the succession of the family property. We show that in subgame perfect equilibrium pattern of free-riding in stage 1 and the likelihood of family property succession in stage 2.

[†] The National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Hibiya Kokusai Building 6th Floor, 2-2-3 Uchisaiwaicho, Chiyodaku, Tokyo 100-0011, Japan. Tel.: +81 3 3595 2984; fax: +81 3 3591 4816. E-mail address: kureishi-wataru@ipss.go.jp