

# Properties of the Equilibrium Revenues in Buy Price Auctions

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## Abstract

This paper considers second-price, sealed-bid auctions with a buy price. Budish and Takeyama (2001) show that a seller who faces risk-averse bidders can improve her expected revenue by properly setting a buy price. It should be noted that they focus on a certain equilibrium in a two-bidder, two-type framework. Contrary to Budish and Takeyama (2001), we consider *all* equilibria. We then show that the collection of the set of the equilibrium revenues has the induced set ordering, and that both the infimum and the maximum of the equilibrium revenues are maximized under the buy price which Budish and Takeyama (2001) mainly concern.

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