

Social choice theory with collectively qualified agendas: The case where there exist voting agenda setters

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Abstract

In a recent paper, Iwata (2011) constructs a model to introduce the process of agenda formation in social choice theory. The model considers a two-stage procedure where a subset of potentially feasible alternatives is collectively qualified by aggregating agenda setters' opinions in the first stage, and a subset of qualified alternatives is socially chosen by aggregating voters' preferences in the second stage. We extend the proposed framework to the case where there exist voting agenda setters who prefer positive alternatives, to neutral ones, to negative ones in terms of their own opinion. When each voting agenda setter has such a preference space, we first characterize Arrow-consistent preference domains on which a social choice correspondence with the fixed qualified agenda. Furthermore, we consider a family of social choice correspondences with the fixed qualified agendas and provide a generalization of Arrow's impossibility theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.

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