

報告要旨

The structure of the Competitive Equilibria in Assignment Markets

筑波大学 システム情報工学科 社会システム工学専攻
博士前期課程 2 年 崔誠賢 (さい せいけん)

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the structure of the set of competitive equilibria in a generalized assignment market. It is well known that in the case where all units of indivisible goods are homogeneous, if there are multiple equilibrium quantities, the equilibrium price is uniquely determined, and otherwise, the equilibrium prices are restricted by some pair of marginal costs. We show that this fact holds even in a generalized assignment market with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We have also the parallel results by switching the equilibrium prices and the equilibrium quantities. These results are proved only under the basic assumptions on the generalized assignment market. They characterize also the size of the set of competitive equilibria. Using our results, we give a condition for large assignment markets so that the set of competitive prices shrinks to a unique price vector as the market gets larger.