

A Citizen-Candidate Model with Sequential Entry*

Akifumi Ishihara[†] Shintaro Miura[‡]

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Abstract

This article studies a citizen-candidate model where the entry decision is sequential rather than simultaneous. We demonstrate by a model with three potential candidates that in contrast to the simultaneous entry model, (i) strategic candidacy emerges on a two-candidate equilibrium, (ii) there is no one-candidate equilibrium even if there is a strict Condorcet winner among the potential candidates, and (iii) there can be a one-candidate equilibrium on which the unique entrant is not a Condorcet winner.

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[†]Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University. E-mail: ishihara@econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp

[‡]Department of Economics, Kanagawa University. Email: smiura@kanagawa-u.ac.jp