

Strategic Voting and Condorcet Jury Theorem under Uncertainty about Player's Information Precision

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Abstract

We analyze the efficiency of decision under strategic voting in a committee. We construct a Bayesian model in which the information precision of a voter is determined randomly. We show three results. First, we provide a sufficient condition for welfare monotonicity. Second, we give an example that adding the members to the committee do not improve welfare in a small committee. Finally, we show that the probabilities that the committee decides to choose the better alternatives under the simple majority rule are increasing in the number of committee members when the committee size is large enough. This implies that if there are sufficiently many candidates for the committee members, the optimal committee design is that everyone participates in the committee.

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