アラブの春におけるソーシャルメディア
均衡選択理論によるアプローチ*

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Abstract

I investigate the role of social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) in the Arab Spring. I analyze a coordination game of incomplete information with a continuous-time pre-play phase in which players post messages about whether to attack a regime. First, they receive noisy private signals about a state of the regime and then post messages. Second, they stochastically receive opportunities to update their messages until a given deadline. Third, they actually decide whether to attack the regime at the deadline. They cannot necessarily commit themselves to their messages. The regime censors the Internet and punishes players attempting to revolt, irrespective of actual actions, if it finds them. I show that the Internet censorship can be a commitment device and that even though the private signals are very noisy, the players conform to the Pareto dominance criterion (and typically revolt) if they update messages frequently and to the risk dominance criterion (and typically do not revolt) if infrequently. Even without changes of the state of the regime, the selected equilibrium transits according to the frequency. Applying this analysis, I elucidate the mechanism whereby the social media facilitated the riots in the Arab Spring and discuss why preexisting media (TV, etc.) did not. These results are consistent with existing empirical evidence.

Keywords: Global games, equilibrium selection, the Arab Spring, social media, Internet censorship.