

# Evolutionary imitative dynamics with population-varying aspiration levels\*

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## Abstract

We consider models of deterministic evolution in games with finite strategies in which populations of agents interact with themselves and with each other. All populations have a same set of strategies and an identical payoff function, but they differ in their imitative decision rules. We show that all the populations will have an identical distribution over strategies in the long run despite differences in the decision rules.

**Keywords:** Learning; Imitation; Multiple Populations.

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