

## **Does the heterogeneity of project implementers affect the program participation of beneficiaries?: Evidence from rural Cambodia**

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Using the dataset from rural Cambodia, we focused on the heterogeneous preferences of project implementers, often overlooked in the literature of program evaluation. Our study focuses on the “implementer effect” on program participation for the treated farmers. In particular, we show the altruism of project staff, measured by the dictator game, consistently increases participation and number of participations in the training sessions of beneficiaries. While few studies focused on heterogeneity of the program implementers, our empirical results indicate the preference of implementers could be a source of treatment heterogeneity and imply the importance of how an actual project is implemented.

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