Characterizing minimal impartial rules for awarding prizes∗

Shohei Tamura†

Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University

January 22, 2015

Abstract

We study the problem of choosing prize winners from among a group of experts when each expert nominates another expert for the prize. A nomination rule determines the set of winners on the basis of the profile of nominations; the rule is impartial if one’s nomination never influences one’s own chance of winning the prize. In this paper, we consider impartial, anonymous, symmetric, and monotonic nomination rules and characterize the set of all minimal such ones. We show that the set consists of exactly one nomination rule: a natural variant of the plurality correspondence called plurality with runners-up.

Keywords: Institutional design; Award rule; Conflict of interest; Impartiality; Plurality correspondence

JEL Classification: D63, D71

∗The author is grateful to Shinji Ohseto for his helpful suggestions. He also thanks Kazuhiko Hashimoto, Ryo Hori, Shigemi Izumida, Takashi Kunimoto, Mitsunobu Miyake, Shigehiro Serizawa, Koichi Tadenuma, Takashi Ui, Zhen Zhao, and seminar participants at Hitotsubashi University, Osaka University and Tohoku University for their useful comments. This research was partially supported by Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research/Moriguchi Prize.

†E-mail address: tamura.econ.tohoku@gmail.com