

Deliberation Monotonic Social Choice

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Abstract

Deliberation is often said to be important in a democratic society, but it is not known which voting rules can appropriately reflect the consequences of deliberation. We introduce some axioms that capture this point and identify voting rules that satisfy our axioms in a one-dimensional spatial model. We first show that a voting rule satisfies *individual deliberation monotonicity* and other standard axioms if and only if it is either the leftmost rule or the rightmost rule. We then characterize a class of voting rules that satisfy *efficiency*, *anonymity*, *neutrality*, *strategy-proofness*, and *total deliberation monotonicity*. We also obtain counterparts of these characterizations in a binary choice model.

Keywords: Deliberation monotonicity, Deliberative democracy, Median rule, Unanimity rule

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