Presenter: **Saori Chiba** (千葉早織)

Title: **Hidden Profiles and Persuasion Cascades in Group Decision-Making**

Authors: Saori Chiba (Kyoto University) and Marco LiCalzi (Universita Ca'Foscari Venezia)

Abstract: This paper provides a model to explain hidden profiles—players do not share their private information with the others, and the group fails. A group of rational players will jointly select a decision through voting. One decision (a correct decision) benefits all players while the other decision (a wrong decision) hurts all of them. Attributes decide which decision is correct, but each player privately and imperfectly knows those attributes. Hence, before voting, the players meet and sequentially talk. Some player may benevolently talk about his information, which is against the correct decision. Because of this talk, the next player expects that the wrong decision is more likely to be correct than the correct decision while his private information is against this expectation. The next player repeats the previous talk because he does not want to confuse the other players with his private information. In this way, the players persuade one another by withholding private information and repeating commonly shared information. As a result, the group is misguided to select a wrong decision.