

Non-manipulable Agenda Setting and Voting

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Abstract

Even though there are many potential alternatives, in reality, not all of them are given into a choice set of voters. This is because voters' choice set, an *agenda*, is made by agenda setters. However, agenda setters may have an incentive to set an agenda so that an outcome he prefers is chosen by voters. The purpose of this paper is to find conditions on agenda setters' preferences under which voting rules are non-manipulable via agenda setting. Assuming that voters' preferences are single-peaked, we show that, whenever monetary rewards to agenda setters are not allowed, any unanimous voting rule is manipulable via agenda setting. We also show that in a mechanism that gives monetary rewards to agenda setters, the median rule is non-manipulable via agenda setting if and only if all agenda setters have no special interest in alternatives. A policy implication of these results is that agenda setters should be the ones who are totally irrelevant to the political issues.

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