

# **Informative Campaign: Multidimensionality and Irrational Voters**

(Preliminary and Incomplete)

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## **Abstract**

We construct a model where the incumbent and a challenger compete with each other in an election, and each candidate decides how to allocate her/his own resources to two types of campaign: policy and ability. Then, we show that the challenger's political campaign on the incumbent's ability (i.e., negative campaign against the incumbent) can be informative so long as sufficient number of irrational voters exists, even when the campaign is not verifiable and it incurs no monetary cost. Overall, this study demonstrates that (i) campaign allocation over multidimensional subjects sends a credible message to rational voters, and (ii) the existence of irrational voters is essential to creating informative campaign.

**Keywords:** Campaign advertising; Negative Campaign; Irrational voters; Signaling

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