

Nomination, Rationality, and Collective Choice

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Abstract

In this study, we examine the validity of collective rationality condition in a two-stage collective choice procedure with the process of nomination. We first show that even the minimal requirement of collective rationality implies that the opinions of nominators, which are expressed in the first stage of collective choice, must be irrelevant to the second stage of collective choice, in which the preferences of voters are expressed. This result has a difficulty that the minimal collective rationality condition must separate the first stage and the second stage of collective choice. Alternatively, we propose *nominee-efficient* collective choice, in which the opinions of nominators influence the second stage of collective choice. Then, a new concept of conditional (on the opinions of nominators) rationalizability and its axiomatic foundation are provided. Furthermore, we characterize the process of nomination under which nominee-efficient collective choice is compatible with Arrow's well-known axioms.

JEL classification: D71, D72

Keywords: nomination, nominee-efficiency, collective rationality, conditional rationalizability, collective choice

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