

Interpersonal Comparison Necessary for Fair Collective Choice

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Abstract

We consider the problem of aggregating individuals' evaluations over alternatives into an ordering. We study what kind of information basis is necessary for providing a collective choice that satisfies strong Pareto principle, anonymity and independence of irrelevant alternatives. We characterize the class of invariance axioms that are compatible with the above three axioms, when interpersonal evaluation level comparison is prohibited. This result implies that what we call *interpersonal evaluation distance comparability* is necessary, if individuals' evaluation levels cannot be compared interpersonally.

JEL Classification: D63, D71.

Key words: Social welfare functional, Information basis, Interpersonal evaluation distance comparability, Generalized utilitarianism.

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