

Abstract

This paper presents a case study of a Japanese university student-supervisor matching. We report more recent reform of the matching mechanism between students and supervisors in a Japanese university. Previously the university had used the Boston or priority matching mechanisms, but a mechanism based on the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism was adopted in this reform. In this mechanism, both students and supervisors are classified as one of the types, depending on their affiliations. Then, supervisors set type-specific maximal and minimal quotas. For fulfilling minimal quotas, maximal quotas were dynamically adjusted. The proposed assignment mechanism was based on a mechanism slightly to change Fragiadakis and Troyan (2017). It is proved that the mechanism may not satisfy strategy-proofness and feasibility, but it eliminates justified envy among the same type of students and a different type. Moreover, if the sum of student's and supervisor's ranks on final assignment is viewed as a measure of welfare, there is no domination relationship between the mechanism and the DA.