

# Non-altruistic equilibria

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## Abstract

Which choice will a player make if he can make one of two choices in which his own payoffs are equal, but his rival's payoffs are not equal, *i.e.* one with a large payoff for his rival and the other with a small payoff for his rival? This paper introduces non-altruistic equilibria for normal form games and extensive form non-altruistic equilibria for extensive form games as equilibrium concepts of noncooperative games by discussing such a problem and examines the connections between their equilibrium concepts and Nash and subgame perfect equilibria that are important and frequently encountered equilibrium concepts.

Keywords: Normal form game; Extensive form game; Non-altruistic equilibrium.

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