This paper adopts a multiple selves model and the idea of coalitional behavior. In our model, We consider that individuals have multiple selves, these selves can sometimes combine as a coalition and individuals can sometimes form coalition with other individuals. We examine, by using two example, how stationary distributions differ from settings with no coalitions and how changes in the probabilities with which different coalitions update strategies affect the stationary distributions. In a first example, we can observe that the probability of a state that the total payoff of all players is maximized increases as the probability of coalition consisting of whole players goes up, and interestingly enough, such state can be attained even if the probability of coalition consisting of whole players is zero. In addition, this paper confirm that a coalition not by all players affects the probability of a state that the total payoff of all players is maximized. An second example in this paper confirms that a non-Nash equilibrium state occurs with positive probability in spite of zero probability of coalition by all players.