

Ex ante stability in school choice under acceptant substitutable priorities*

Yusuke Iwase[†]

Graduate School of Economics, The University of Tokyo

April 18, 2019

Abstract

In school choice problem, fairness has been a key concern for students. In the present paper, we investigate two ex ante fairness, ex ante stability and no ex ante discrimination, under complex priority structures. Acceptance and substitutability which are weaker than responsiveness are assumed on priority structures. We show that under acceptant substitutable priority structures, the algorithm we construct produces an ex ante stable random matching which is not ex ante discriminating for any preference profile. Moreover, we give an example in which the outcome of the algorithm dominates any other fair matching.

Keywords: *acceptance, substitutability, ex ante stability, no ex ante discrimination, ordinal domination*

*I am grateful to Michihiro Kandori for his guidance. I would also like to thank Taro Kumano for helpful discussions and comments.

[†]Email address: iwaseyusuke1209@gmail.com