

Collective mistake in a tricky question under strategic voting*

Tomoya Tajika[†]

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We consider a situation in which voters collectively answer a binary question. Each voter obtains a signal about the answer to the question, but the precision of the signal depends on the question type that is unknown to any voter. If each voter receives an informative signal on the question type, the majority rule under sincere voting correctly aggregates the information with a large electorate; however, it is not an equilibrium. We show that in a unique pure-strategy equilibrium with a large electorate, majority voting makes an *incorrect* decision with a probability that can be sufficiently close to 1.

Keyword: Information aggregation; inefficiency; precision uncertainty; strategic voting

JEL Classification: C72; D72.

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[†]Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Naka 2-1, Kunitachi, Tokyo, 186-8603. Email: tajika@ier.hit-u.ac.jp