

Law Enforcement with Delegated Agents and Penal Populism

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Abstract

This paper provides a simple law enforcement model that focuses on the several principal-agent relations in the modern criminal policy process. This paper shows that the citizen may or may not choose the government that cares about the welfare of criminals. This framework fills the gap in the traditional law and economics literature about how and why the government cares about the benefits of criminals as in Dau-Schmidt (1990) and Lewin and Trumbull (1990). Our results also extend the discussion about how to manage the incentive contract for the law enforcement authority, the regional differences towards punitive criminal policies and the mechanism for an emergence of punitive society.

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Key words: Penal Populism; Law Enforcement; Punitiveness; Political Economics

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