

A characterization of the pairwise majority rule by non-manipulability and decisiveness

Keio University

Hiroyuki Komatsu*

Abstract

We consider social preference functions, which map each preference profile to merely a complete binary relation of alternatives. The purpose of this paper is to characterize the pairwise majority rule, which determines the social comparison between any two alternatives depended only on how many individuals prefer one to the other. We show that the pairwise majority rule is more decisive than any other social preference function satisfying neutrality, anonymity, and a property about manipulability. Also we show that the pairwise majority rule is the unique social preference function satisfying neutrality, anonymity, non-manipulability, and positive responsiveness.

*Graduate School of Economics, Keio University, Tokyo 108-8345, Japan,
Email: komatsu@z2.keio.jp